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This paper uses survey data from Iceland on 884 firms to test for the theory of 
customer markets proposed by Phelps and Winter (1970) and Okun (1981). The 
results provide support for the customer market theory in that managers agree that 
customers are valuable to firms – they rank them second only to employees – and they 
use various means of augmenting and retaining their customer base, such as 
advertising. Surprisingly, however, price setting appears not to be an important ploy 
for attracting and retaining customers. In this we confirm the earlier results of Lye and 
Sibly (1994) using Australian data. Instead, advertising and direct contact with 
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The pricing behaviour of firms operating in imperfectly competitive goods markets 
affects the equilibrium rate of unemployment when real wages are rigid. An increase 
of markups of price over marginal cost is equivalent to a fall in the real demand wage 
and raises the level of equilibrium unemployment. One prominent theory describing 
the price decisions by firms operating in imperfectly competitive goods markets is the 
customer market theory of Okun (1981) and Phelps and Winter (1970). In the 
customer markets framework firms have market power which stems from either 
imperfect information about prices, switching costs or habit formation. It follows that 
a firm can raise its price without instantly losing all of its customers because it takes 
time for the news of such price increases to spread between customers. However, 
customers will gradually abandon a firm that charges higher prices than its rivals. 
Hence there exists an intertemporal trade-off between current and future profits; 
higher prices raise current profits at the expense of future profits. In essence, price 
cuts constitute an investment in a larger market share and price setting should depend 
on variables such as real interest rates and the expected growth of purchases per 
consumer.  
In this paper we explore the practical relevance of customer market theory, in 
particular the extent to which firms use prices as opposed to other marketing measures 
such as advertising and direct contact with customers.  
 
I. Literature 
The basic customer-market model has clear implications for the cyclical behaviour of 
markups. When current demand (per customer) is high, current profits matter more 
relative to future profits, which should make firms raise markups. This may not sound 
very plausible because such a price increase is tantamount to a fall in the real demand 
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wage and real wages are not counter-cyclical in the data (see Barsky and Solon, 
1994). Partly in response to this criticism, recent work has enriched the customer-
market framework in ways that helps it square up with the empirical evidence. Bils 
(1989) argues that when the state of high demand involves an inflow of new potential 
customers who are yet unattached to any one supplier, it is in the interest of firms to 
lower their markups in order to attract these new customers. In effect, the marginal 
benefit of cutting prices is raised during boom periods. Similarly, Ravn, Schmitt-
Grohé and Urìbe (2006) present a model where the firm faces two types of customers, 
those who have developed a taste for the firm’s products and those who have not. The 
weight of the demand elasticity of the non-habitual customers rises during booms and 
markups decline. A recent paper by Bagwell (2004) arrives at similar results by 
assuming a positive correlation between current and future growth in demand. In a 
somewhat different setup, Ireland (1998) argues that high demand implies more 
purchases, which in turn fuels consumer search activity undermining the supplier’s 
monopoly power. Finally, Choudhary and Orszag (2007) propose the idea of a fixed 
cost of servicing each customer. As demand rises, customers purchase more units 
while the cost of servicing each of them remains fixed. This allows firms to spread 
these costs over a larger number of units sold, the marginal cost of expanding the 
market share is now lower and markups become countercyclical.1
                                                 
1 Another category of models identifies procyclical demand elasticity as the root cause of the observed 
behaviour of markups (see Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Warner and Barsky (1995) and Gali (1994)). 
Yet another category concentrates on the strategic behaviour of firms, such as Rotemberg and Saloner 
(1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991). Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) further develop this 
idea. A fourth category links imperfections in capital and product markets. For example Greenwald, 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) propose different mechanisms through 
which cash-flow problems during recessions lead firms to limit their investments in market shares. A 
fifth category uses the input-output relations between firms to explain the behaviour of markups. Basu 
(1995) is one example. The sixth and final category of models is based on the idea of the ‘pied-piper,’ 
commonly known as the loss-leader pricing. In these models firms find it more efficient to advertise 
and commit to a low price when demand is high in order to attract customer who may also buy higher-
priced goods so as to avoid search costs (see Lal and Matutes (1994) and Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi 
(2000)).  
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In contrast to the emphasis on inter-temporal trade-offs in the original 
contribution of Phelps and Winter (1970) and in later contributions just described, 
Akerlof (2007) uses customer markets to explain price rigidities. He argues that prices 
seem to be especially sticky in customer markets and attributes this to price norms, 
that customers have an idea about what constitutes a fair price which makes firms 
only change prices very infrequently. If he is right, the emphasis on explaining 
whether desired markups are counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical in the previous literature 
is somewhat misplaced. Earlier, Okun (1981) had argued that firms would be reluctant 
to raise price above the level expected by customers for fear of appearing unreliable, 
which would lower profits in the future. A similar point is also argued in a recent 
paper by Nakamura and Steinsson (2005) who show that firms operating in customer 
markets may keep prices unchanged as a part of an implicit contract with habit-
forming customers. Lye and Sibly (1994) provide supportive evidence by applying the 
customer market model to the study of the Australian meat and vegetable retail 
markets where they find evidence for price rigidity. McDonald (1990) extends the 
theory of the determination of retail prices in a customer market to a shop selling 
many types of goods and demonstrates how the theory can explain the relative 
stability of retail prices. Sibly (2007) shows how the introduction of imperfect 
customer information reduces the variability in retail prices when customers repeat 
purchase. With stable prices, firms may use other measures to attract and retain 
customers, such as advertising or an emphasis on good service and quality products. 
 In this paper we use survey evidence to test the fundamental implication of 
customer market theory which is that firms view their customer base – market share – 
as an asset and then explore the methods that they apply to augment and protect this 
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asset. In particular, we are interested in knowing how important price setting is in this 
regard. 
Using surveys to test economic theories is of course not without its difficulties. 
Non-economists may not understand the intended meaning of different questions 
which make slight changes in the wording of the questions have disproportionate 
responses. Also, in many cases managers go by their own intuition or gut feeling, 
which they may or may not be capable of explaining to others. Partly, in response to 
these anticipated difficulties, we did not ask the managers explicitly whether they 
choose to keep prices fixed over the business cycle or whether they choose to change 
them in a systematic way. Instead, we asked specific questions about the nature of the 
customer-supplier relationship and how they would change prices in response to 
changes in the macroeconomic environment that will give us an indirect answer.  
 
II. Survey method 
We use data from Iceland partly because we are knowledgeable about that particular 
country but also because most of its internal markets are imperfectly competitive due 
to its small size. The survey is the first of its kind in the country and differs from 
previous international work on pricing by its focus on customer market theory.2 Our 
                                                 
2 Blinder (1991) and Blinder et al. (1998) initiated the use of surveys in their study of price setting in 
the United States and found considerable price stickiness due to multiple reasons such as coordination 
failures, implicit and explicit contracts and pro-cyclical demand elasticity. Bhaskar et al. (1993) 
conducted a survey of British managers in which they were asked about the actions they would take in 
booms and recessions. The responses suggested that quantity adjustments were by far more important 
than price adjustments over the business cycle. A recent paper by Fabiani et al. (2006) shows the 
results of a survey of pricing behaviour in the euro area. The results are somewhat similar across 
countries. They find that markup pricing is the main price-setting strategy in the euro area and implicit 
and explicit contracts between firms and their customers an important factor behind the price 
stickiness. While firms are likely to raise prices when the cost of production goes up, they choose to 
keep prices unchanged when demand increases in order not to upset their customers. Similar studies for 
other countries include Apel et al. (2005) for Sweden, Amirault et al. (2004) for Canada, Small and 
Yates (1999) and Hall et al. (1997, 2000) for the UK, Hoeberichts and Stockman (2005) for Holland, 
Kwapil et al. (2005) for Austria, Loupias and Richart (2004) for France, Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) 
for Luxemburg and Stahl (2005) for Germany. 
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sample consists of 884 firms, each with 4 employees or more. It is randomly selected 
from the National register of firms in Iceland.3 All firms in the sample are separate 
firms, not branches of larger companies. They are located in all parts of the country, 
some in the consumer market and others selling their services to other businesses. All 
sectors are represented; manufacturing, services and retail/whole-sales. In each firm, 
either the CEO or the CFO responded.4 We will refer to the respondent as the 
manager henceforth. Of the 884 firms, 234 refused to answer and 146 could not be 
reached. This yields 504 respondents, which is a 57% response rate.  
 The survey includes nine questions. All but one of the questions were closed and 
response categories were read to respondents. A manager was first asked whether his 
firm was privately or publicly owned. Of the 504 responders, 136 were public and 
were dropped from the sample. The questions that followed were on the number of 
competitors in the market; the most and second most important reason for customer 
loyalty; and an assessment of when the firm is in the greatest danger of loosing some 
of its customers. An open-ended question followed on what the respondents thought 
was the most effective way of acquiring new customers. Next, they were asked about 
the most valuable asset of the firm and the second-most valuable asset. Finally, there 
were three questions on whether the manager would raise markups, lower markups or 
leave them unchanged in response to changes in the changing economic environment. 
                                                 
3 Iceland has a population of 300,000 people, the vast majority of the working-age population 
belonging to the service sector. Its labour market is well integrated geographically and the population 
mass is urban and concentrated in the capital city Reykjavik and vicinity. Perhaps partly due to the 
flexibility of the labour market, the country ranked ninth in the world in terms of (PPP-adjusted) GDP 
per capita in 2002 and second in terms of a quality-of-life index (The Economist, World in Figures). 
4 The survey was conducted over the phone between January 26 and February 20 2006. Calls were 
made during weekdays by trained interviewers and they always asked for the CEO. If he or she was not 
in, the interviewer asked for the CFO. If neither was in, a call was made later same day or the following 
day. Questions were programmed in CATI (computer-assisted telephone interview) software called 
NIPO. After a call was made and a respondent accepted the interview each question appeared on a 
computer screen in front of the interviewer and answers were immediately punched in at the keyboard. 
All answers were saved in a database and after the last interview transformed to SPSS, which was used 
to analyse the results. 
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Respondents were asked about three hypothetical changes; an increase in current 
demand for the products5 leaving future demand unchanged; an expected increase in 
future demand while current demand stays the same, and; an interest rates increase.6
 
III. Results 
It should not come as a surprise that managers consider customers to be an asset. 
However, it is more interesting to see how they rank them alongside other assets such 
as the value of trained employees. We first report responses to the question about the 
most valuable and the second-most valuable asset of the firm. Managers were given a 
list of possibilities. The results are shown in Table 1 below. While employees 
received the highest score, customers came in a clear second. Of responders, 21.5% 
rated customers as their firm’s most valuable asset while 35% rated them as the 
second-most valuable asset. This clearly provides support for customer-market theory. 
Only the stock of firm’s employees received higher ratings, 55.1% said they 
constituted the most valuable asset and 30.9% the second-most valuable asset. Just 
over 17% responded that it was their trademark or image. Very few respondents 
mentioned other assets. An aggregate measure for the most valuable asset (given a 
weight of 2) and the second most valuable asset (with weight of 1) shows the same 








                                                 
5 By "products" we mean both products and services. 
6 In addition to the nine survey questions, information was obtained on background variables for each 
firm, such as yearly turnover, number of employees, location, markets (consumer or business to 
business) and industry (manufacturing, services, or retail/whole-sales). 
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Workers 55.1 30.9 47.0 
Customers 21.6 35.0 26.1 
Trademark  17.3 21.3 18.6 
Location 2.6 6.7 3.9 
Assets in 
accounts* 1.7 5.0 2.8 
Other assets 1.7 1.2 1.5 
Total 100 100 100 
* Such as bank deposits, machinery and housing. 
 
We next report responses to questions that were aimed at testing whether managers 
treated price setting as an intertemporal investment decision. In Table 2 responses to 
the three questions on the effect of hypothetical changes in the economic environment 
are shown.  
 
Table 2. Effect of higher demand and interest rates 
 
 Demand increasesTemporarily (%) 
Current demand unchanged, but 
expected future demand increased (%) 
Interest rates
go up (%) 
Unchanged 84.1 86.7 57.9 
Higher prices 11.9 8.8 41.7 
Lower prices 4.0 4.5 0.3 




Most managers would leave prices unchanged if demand rose temporarily or was 
expected to rise in the future (around 85% of respondents). Only about 10% would 
raise markups and less than 5% would lower them. These results confirm the 
existence of substantial price stickiness as found in the macroeconomic literature (see 
Fabiani et al. (2006) cited above). While keeping prices unchanged in the face of 
increased demand is consistent with both the idea of counter-cyclical desired markups 
as well as the hypothesis that firms choose to keep prices unchanged because of price 
norms or an implicit contract with habit-forming customers, keeping prices 
unchanged when demand is expected to rise in the future is only consistent with the 
latter. Clearly, an expected demand increase should make the marginal benefit of 
cutting prices rise which should make desired markups fall.  
 The existence of price norms within the customer market framework was 
proposed by Akerlof (2007) and the idea that firms keep prices unchanged as a part of 
an implicit contract with habit-forming customers was described by Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2005). These authors argue that keeping prices stable is the best way of 
attracting customers. The responses to the second question provide support for the 
existence of price norms and/or implicit contracts about stable prices. Keeping prices 
unchanged in the face of an anticipated future increase of demand implies that 
markups are not cut when a future increase is expected.7 This suggests that prices are 
kept unchanged in the face of expected demand increases as well as current ones.8
                                                 
7 Unless firms also increase production – hence experience rising marginal costs – in anticipation of 
higher sales 
8 In a recent paper, Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) use a data set taken from a large supermarket 
chain in Chicago and find that retail prices fall during periods of peak product demand, in contrast to 
higher overall demand for all goods. Moreover, they find that the falling prices are due to falling 
markups. We did not find this effect in the responses. In the case of current demand increases 94% of 
whole sale/retail firms would leave markups unchanged, while 79% of manufacturing firms would do 
the same, and 86% of service industry firms. 
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 Of respondents, 41.7% would raise prices in response to higher interest rates. 
These responses to an increase of interest rates can be explained by the inter-temporal 
dimension customer market theory: When interest rates rise, we expect firm to cut 
back investment in new customers, hence raise markups and prices. However, price 
norms may also yield this implication. When interest rates rise firms can justify price 
increases because of increased costs; customers understand the need for price 
increases when interest rates rise.  
 The next question was meant to inquire further about the nature of the supplier-
customer relationship. Managers were asked about the most important reason and the 
second-most important reason for customers to stay with the firm, i.e. reasons for 
customer loyalty. Respondents were given five answer choices in a random order. The 
results for the most and second-most important reason were then aggregated, were the 
most important reason got the weight of 2 and second most important reason got the 
weight of 1. Table 3 shows the results. 
 








important reason (2) 
% 
(1) and (2) 
combined 
% 
Superior service 40.7 24.9 35.4 
Superior products 38.7 19.2 32.2 
Lower prices 8.3 27.6 14.7 
Habit formation 6.9 26.7 13.5 
No apparent alternative 
supplier 5.4 1.5 4.1 




Two reasons for customer loyalty received far more support than the others. These 
were "superior service" (35.4%) and "superior products" (32.2%). In third and fourth 
place were "lower prices" (14.7%) and "habit formation" (13.5%). Both obtained even 
greater support as the second most important reason (over a quarter for each).9 
Clearly, it is difficult for managers to claim that superior products and services are not 
the reason for customer loyalty. The 26.7% of respondents who claim that habit 
formation is the second-most important reason for customer loyalty provide support 
for customer market theory. 
 The next question asked respondents when customers were most likely to leave 
their firm. This is a test of the hypotheses of Bils (1989), Ireland (1998), Bagwell 
(2004), Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Urìbe (2006), namely that customers are more 
likely to leave when demand is high. While almost half of responders said customers 
were more likely to leave during a recession, more than 10% chose booms and about 
40% said this was independently of the economic situation.10  
 
Table 4. When is a firm most likely to lose a customer?  
 
 % 
In a recession 48.9 
Independent of the state of the economy 39.9 
In a boom 11.2 
Total 100 
                                                 
9 Firms with more competitors are more likely to mention better service and better products or service 
as the most important reason for customer loyalty. Those who are in the service industry are more 
likely to say better service (55%) as the most important reason for customer loyalty, more so than those 
who are in manufacturing (34%) or whole sale/retail (27%). On the other hand, those in 
wholesale/retail are more likely to name better product or service (53%). 
10 Firms having none or 1-2 office workers are far more likely to say that their customers are likely to 
leave them during recession (73% and 52% respectively) than those who have 6-10 office workers 
(23%) or more than 10 office workers (30%). On the other hand, those who have more than 10 office 
workers are more likely to say that their customers are likely to leave them in boom years (30%), than 
those who have none (4%) or 1-2 office workers (8%). 
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Not surprisingly, most managers fear losing customers in recessions. However, it may 
come as a surprise to some that 11.2% of respondents claim that their firm is most 
likely to lose customers during economic expansions. Finally, we inquire about how 
firms go about attracting new customers; that is investing in a larger market share.  
 
Table 5. The most effective way to attract new customers  
 
 
%  %  % 
Good service 17.6 Good quality 6.2 Marketing 2.9 
Advertising/junk mail 17.1 Trust/honesty 3.8 Customer satisfaction 1.8 
Reputation 16.8 Good performance 3.8 Salesmanship 1.5 
Visits to customers 14.4 Good prices 2.9   
One-to-one contact 8.2 Other reasons 2.9   
Total     100 
 
In this open-ended question on what would be the best way of acquiring new 
customers almost 18% mentioned good service, over 17% mentioned advertisements 
or mail, and almost 17% word of mouth. These were the top three reasons for 
acquiring new customers. The fourth reason was "visits and information meetings" 
(14.4%), then "personal interaction" (8.2%) and finally "good product" (6.2%). Other 
reasons were mentioned with less frequency. Note that price-cutting is only 
mentioned as the most effective way of attracting new customers by 2.6% of 
respondents. Apart from good service and quality, managers mention advertising 
more frequently,11 as well as visits and one-to-one contacts with customers. Table 5 
confirms the overall impression of price rigidity found in Table 2 above. There we 
                                                 
11 Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) also emphasise the substantial role advertising plays in 
attracting customers in periods of high seasonal demand.  
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found that prices are kept unchanged when demand goes up or is expected to increase. 
Now we find that price changes are not considered to be an effective way of attracting 
customers. We can conclude that customer market theory is less suited to explaining 
price changes and better suited to explaining price inertia.  
 
IV. Concluding thoughts 
The survey results presented in this paper provide support for the customer market 
theory of Phelps and Winter (1970). Managers agree that customers are valuable to 
firms, they rank them second to employees, and they use various means of 
augmenting their customer base, such as advertising. They also mention habit 
formation as a source of customer loyalty.  
 However, price setting appears not to be an important tool when it comes to 
attracting and retaining customers. In this we confirm the earlier results of Lye and 
Sibly (1994), who used Australian data. Instead, advertising and direct contact with 
customers are listed as the more important. In contrast to the conventional view of 
customer-markets, our results suggest that such markets display rigid prices and 
infrequent prices changes involving intertemporal choices. While rigid prices do 
imply counter-cyclical markups when marginal costs are rising in output, the fact that 
prices are not changed in anticipation of increased demand implies that firms do not 
deliberately adjust markups and price inertia is the rule. This in turn provides direct 
support for Okun (1981) and also for Akerlof (2007), who argues that prices seem to 
be especially sticky in customer markets due to price norms. Similarly, our survey 
equally supports Nakamura and Steinsson (2005) who argue that firms keep prices 
unchanged as a part of an implicit contract with habit-forming customers and Sibly 
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(2007) who shows how the introduction of imperfect customer information reduces 
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